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The development of EU trade and investment policies:  





Regulation of foreign investment presents one of the most topical and controversial 
subjects in EU external relations. The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the 
introduction of EU competence over foreign direct investment (FDI) in Article 207 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has generated broad 
discussions regarding the scope of the “new” EU competence and how it affects 
Member States’ foreign investment policies and in particular their Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs). However, the foundations for an active EU role in the 
field of foreign investment were already laid by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
In 2009 the Court declared that certain provisions of Member States BITs are 
incompatible with EU law, indicating that the existing legal framework has to be 
amended.1 Following these developments, the European Commission recently 
announced its intentions to establish a new EU investment policy.2 Without 
elaborating on its views on the specific scope of the EU investment policy and how it 
interacts with existing Member States’ investment policies, the Commission has 
rendered clear its aim to transform the EU into the main player in the field of foreign 
investment. 
The emergence of EU investment policy meets a number of legal, political and 
practical challenges, which the involved political actors will have to tackle within the 
following years. As discussed in previous chapters, the very existence of an EU 
investment policy depends on the specific delineation of the scope of EU competence 
over foreign investment, not only under Article 207 TFEU, but also under other 
provisions of the EU Treaties. Its successful materialization rests on the careful 
determination of the specific objectives and content of future investment agreements 
as well as on the clear demarcation of the roles of the EU and its Member States in 
policy-making in the field of foreign investment. Thus, it is claimed that EU 
institutions and Member States have to set up an investment policy that guarantees in 
the long-term the integration and interaction of Member States’ national investment 
policies with EU policy both in substantive and in institutional terms. In addition, the 
smooth transition from Member States’ investment policies to EU investment policy 
is necessary to preserve European investors’ interests and rights and to sooth the 
                       
1 Case C-205/06, Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Austria, 2009 E.C.R. I-
1301; Case C-249/06, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Sweden, 2009 E.C.R. 
I-1335; Case C-118/07, Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Finland, 2009 
E.C.R. I-10889. 
2 EU Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a 
comprehensive European international investment policy, COM(2010)343 final (available as annex to 
this volume) (hereinafter Investment Policy Communication), available at:  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/july/tradoc_146307.pdf (last visited November 21, 2010); 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing transitional 
arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries, 
COM(2010)344 final (available as annex to this volume (hereinafter Regulation Proposal), available at: 





concerns of third countries.3 Legal certainty is a key element of the Commission’s 
planned action,4 focusing in particular on the compatibility of the existing Member 
States BITs with EU Law.  
Although foreign investment presents a new field for EU external action, it is 
not the first time the EU is faced with such challenges. The introduction of express 
EU competences to act externally, such as in the areas of development policy, 
environment and monetary policy, as well the expansion of the scope of EU implied 
powers, such as in the areas of air transport and freedom, security and justice raised 
concerns in the past regarding the transition from a national to an EU policy 
framework.5 However, the most prominent example of transition constitutes the area 
of trade policy,6 which also bears the most similarities with investment policy. 
Similar to foreign direct investment, EU competence in the field of external trade has 
been a priori exclusive rather than complementary, thus prohibiting Member States’ 
external action, even in cases where the EU had not yet acted. In addition, considering 
the number and content of international agreements concluded, external action has 
been widespread and necessary within trade and foreign investment policy in order to 
fulfill their objectives, rather than being incidental and sporadic covering the external 
aspects on an internal policy. Last but not least, EU action in the field of trade, just 
like in investment, is based on the same constitutional and institutional foundations, as 
both areas are covered by the Common Commercial Policy. As the scope of the 
Common Commercial Policy has expanded from trade in goods to other areas, 
including recently FDI, the analysis of the earlier stages of the Common Commercial 
Policy helps identifying the main characteristics of the Common Commercial Policy 
which are still pertinent today. 
The evolution of the Common Commercial Policy as regards external trade in 
goods can provide useful guidance for the development of EU investment policy. The 
historical process of the formation of EU trade policy and the transition from Member 
States trade policy to EU trade policy presents a unique example, which when read 
within its historical context, can highlight the possible handicaps facing the proposed 
EU investment policy and contribute to the avoidance of discrepancies in its 
formation. For these reasons, this chapter offers an analysis of the historical 
development of EU external trade policy and how that experience can assist in 
designing a better EU investment policy. 
Within this framework, the doctrinal foundations of EU trade policy are 
identified, focusing on the evolution of the scope and nature of EU powers and the 
purposes it served. Afterwards, the materialization of EU trade policy is examined, 
looking at the transition from Member States to EU trade policy in practice. When 
                       
3 Stephen Woolcock and Jan Kleinheisterkamp, “The EU approach to international investment policy 
after the Lisbon Treaty,” Study Directorate General for External Policies of the Union (October 2010), 
p. 6, available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/news/2010-11-03%20EU.pdf (last visited 
November 21, 2010). 
4 Regulation Proposal, supra note 2, Explanatory Memorandum, Policy Options and Consultations with 
Interested Parties. 
5 For an overview  on the transition from national to EU policy in the fields of air transport and 
freedom, security and justice see Marise Cremona, “Member States as trustees of the Community 
interest: Participating in international agreements on behalf of the European Community”, EUI 
Working Paper LAW 2009/17, p. 16-18, available at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/12881 (last 
visited March 28, 2011). 
6 Although trade policy covers today trade in goods and services under WTO rules, the term EU trade 






considering the formation and evolution of EU trade policy over time, the legal and 
policy choices that contributed to the transition from national to EU trade policy are 
explored. Finally, this chapter explores the lessons that the development of EU trade 
policy can offer for a better planning of EU investment policy. Reading the historical 
development of the EU Common Commercial Policy in light of the “different” 
context of the current EU Common Commercial Policy, conclusions are drawn as to 
whether and to what extent the transition from Member States to EU investment 
policy should be based on a similar approach to the transition from Member States to 
EU trade policy.    
 
A. The foundations of EU trade policy 
 
Since the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC),7 the Common 
Commercial Policy has been a major field of EU external relations. Alongside 
association agreements, external trade was the only substantive field where the EEC 
was granted express external competence in the Treaty of Rome.8 Affirming the EU’s 
international legal personality, the evolution of the Common Commercial Policy 
reflects the gradual development of the constitutional foundations of EU law in the 
area of external relations. 
The development of the Common Commercial Policy was primarily linked 
with the completion of the internal market and the need for external representation of 
the EEC as a customs union. Community external powers were initially born as the 
necessary corollary to internal integration, given that the proper functioning of 
internal policies requires in certain circumstances external action.9 In that respect, the 
degree and nature of internal integration in the field of trade in goods affected 
significantly the determination of the scope and nature of the Common Commercial 
Policy. 
The imperative of the completion of the internal market was the main factor 
driving the EEC to take action in the field of the Common Commercial Policy. The 
implementation of the customs union, which was one of the first policies that the EEC 
focused on the 1960s,10 resulted in the creation of the common external tariff. The 
creation of a common, uniform tariff for all products originating in third countries and 
the administration of tariff policy at a centralized level was a necessary step for the 
proper functioning of the customs union.11 As internal integration in the field of trade 
                       
7 Although the European Economic Community is replaced by the European Union after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, for purposes of historical accuracy the terms “EEC” and “Community” 
are used in this article in order to define the internationally acting legal person.   
8 Articles 110-116 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty). 
9 The link between EEC external powers and internal integration was directly established under the 
doctrine of EU implied powers in the AETR case, Case 22/70, Commission of the European 
Communities v. Council of the European Communities, 1971 E.C.R. 263). However, EU express 
powers were also linked to the degree of internal integration, obeying to the same rules which 
determined the scope of Community competence in the field of external relations. See A. Dashwood, 
“The attribution of external relations competence,” in Alan Dashwood and Christophe Hillion, eds., 
The general law of E.C. external relations (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), chapter 8. 
10 Panos Koutrakos, EU international relations law (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006), p. 
12-14. 
11 Marise Cremona, “The external dimension of the internal market” in Catherine Barnard and Joanne 
Scott, eds., The law of the single European market (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002), p. 354-355; Piet 
Eeckhout, External relations of the European Union. Legal and constitutional foundations  (Oxford, 





in goods went beyond the creation of a customs union, the Common Commercial 
Policy was used to formulate common rules with regard to all aspects of external trade 
in goods. The need to avoid “distortion of free internal circulation or of competitive 
conditions”12 was an imperative for extending the Common Commercial Policy to all 
regulatory aspects of trade in goods with third countries, such as customs valuation 
and charges of equivalent effect. As the Court recognized in Opinion 1/78, the 
Common Commercial Policy had to be dynamically interpreted, so as not to “cause 
disturbances in intra-Community trade”.13 
The need for uniform rules regarding trade in goods with third countries 
affected not only the scope but also the nature of EEC powers. In Opinion 1/7514 and 
in Donckerwolke15 the Court recognized the a priori exclusive character of EEC 
competence in the field of the Common Commercial Policy. The Member States 
could not legislate in an area which would affect the operation of the Common 
Commercial Policy, even if the Community had not yet taken any action in the field. 
The a priori pre-emption of the Member States' powers was justified by the need to 
protect the unity of the internal market, with the aim of avoiding distortions in 
competition and risks of trade deflection that could arise if Member States pursued 
their individual external trade policies.16 Besides the internal market imperative, the 
Court considered that exclusivity was necessary to preserve the unity of the 
Community’s position with respect to third countries and to defend the “common 
interests” of the Community.17 Developing the notion of a common Community 
interest in the field of trade in goods, the Court reaffirmed in a different way the 
importance of internal integration, which required common rules for imports and 
exports and harmonizing standards throughout the Community. 
In addition to the link with the internal market, the development of the 
Common Commercial Policy was influenced by the international realities after World 
War II and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The EEC was 
created after the establishment of multilateral rules on trade, reflecting the belief that 
regional economic integration would advance the general objective of trade 
liberalization, as long as it took the form of a free trade agreement or a customs union 
and complied with the requirements of Article XXIV GATT.18 Hence, the Common 
Commercial Policy was necessary for the functioning of the EEC as a customs union 
operating within the framework of GATT 1947. The influence exerted by the GATT 
on the Common Commercial Policy is further reflected at the objectives pursued by 
EU trade policy. Taking into account the pre-existing commitments, which were 
                       
12 Joined Cases C-37/73 and C-38/73, Sociaal Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders v. NV Indiamex and 
Association de fait De Belder, 1973 E.C.R. 1609, para 9. 
13 ECJ Opinion 1/78, Opinion pursuant to Article 228 of the EEC Treaty (October 4, 1979), 1979 
E.C.R. 2871, para. 45. 
14 ECJ Opinion 1/75, Opinion given pursuant to Article 228 of the EEC Treaty (November 11, 1975), 
1975 E.C.R. 1355. 
15 Case 41/76 Donckerwolke and Shou / Procureur de la République au Tribunal de grande instance, 
Lille, and the Director General of Customs,  1976 E.C.R. 1921. 
16 Cremona, “The external dimension of the internal market”,supra note 11, p. 357-358; Gracia Marin 
Duran, Development-based differentiation in the European Community's external trade policy: Selected 
issues under Community and international trade law, Doctoral thesis (European University Institute 
2008), p. 25-26. 
17 For an analysis of the a priori exclusive character of Community competence in the field of the 
Common Commercial Policy see: Koutrakos, EU international relations law, supra note 10, p. 13-17. 
18 Eeckhout, External relations of the European Union. Legal and constitutional foundations, supra 





undertaken individually by Member States under GATT 1947, the drafters of the EEC 
Treaty incorporated into the Common Commercial Policy the principle of 
liberalization expressing their obligation to comply with the requirement of GATT 
that the formation of a customs union shall not lead on the whole to further 
restrictions on trade with third countries.19 
In that respect, the pronouncement of the broad scope and exclusive 
competence of the Common Commercial Policy were directly linked with the 
constitutional evolution of EU law. The creation of an internal market and the realities 
of international trade at the time necessitated initially the creation of a common 
customs policy and subsequently a complete Common Commercial Policy.  
 
B. The gradual development of EU external trade policy in practice 
 
The pragmatic development of the external representation of the EEC was also 
reflected in the gradual implementation of the Common Commercial Policy. An EU 
common external trade policy was completed much later after the end of the 
transitional period that was provided in the Treaty of Rome. Although Article 111 
EEC presented the cornerstone for the transition from Member States to Community 
external trade policy, the end of the transition period did not mark the end of the 
presence of Member States as autonomous international trade actors. The historical 
evolution of the Common Commercial Policy shows the pragmatic terms along which 
it was developed. 
The development of EU external trade policy has been marked by distinct 
phases. During the twelve-year transitional period which was provided in Article 8 of 
the EEC Treaty,20 the foundations of Community trade policy were set out, providing 
the main mechanisms for the transition from Member States’ trade policy to a uniform 
Common Commercial Policy. However, the Common Commercial Policy was not 
completed after the end of the transitional period. Until after the conclusion of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement, Member States retained sparse powers 
in the field of external trade and concluded trade agreements, basing their action on 
the limits and exceptions to the uniform Common Commercial Policy. After the 
completion of the internal market in 1992 and the conclusion of the WTO Agreement, 
trade policy became the exclusive domain of the Common Commercial Policy. This is 
particularly reflected in the transition from national to EU external trade policy of 
Member States that acceded to the EU in 2004 and 2007. 
 
1. Building the Community trade policy during the transitional period (1957-
1969) 
 
                       
19 Cremona, “The external dimension of the internal market”, supra note 11, p.381. However, 
liberalization was only an aspirational aim, unlike the legally binding obligation of creating uniform 
rules. Article 110 EEC did not in itself impose an obligation on the Community either to liberalize 
trade unilaterally, or to mirror internal trade liberalization at the external level, see Case C-51/75, EMI 
Records Ltd v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd, 1976 E.C.R. 811. 
20 Article 8 of the EEC Treaty provided : “1. The Common Market shall be progressively established in 
the course of a transitional period of twelve years. 
The transitional period shall be divided into three stages of four years each; the length of each stage 
may be modified in accordance with the provisions set out below. 






The drafters of the EEC Treaty had recognized the difficulties deriving from the 
passage from Member States to the EU of trade policy and included in Article 111 
EEC specific provisions guiding the action of Community institutions and Member 
States in the field of the Common Commercial Policy during the transitional period. 
Article 111 EEC provided the framework within which the Common Commercial 
Policy should have been developed, placing emphasis on the cooperation and 
coordination of Community and Member States’ trade policies.21 
More specifically, the first paragraph of Article 111 EEC established the 
general obligation of Member States to coordinate their trade policies, assigning to the 
Commission the responsibility to guide coordination. This provision presented the 
main principle guiding the implementation of the Common Commercial Policy during 
the transitional period, indicating the supervisory role of EU institutions and the need 
for active involvement by the Member States.22 Article 111 EEC provided also 
express powers to the Community to conclude trade agreements with third countries 
during the transitional period. These provisions indicated that Community action was 
necessary from the beginning in order to achieve a uniform Common Commercial 
Policy. Nevertheless, Article 111(2) and (3) EEC did not preclude Member States’ 
action during the transitional period, recognizing that Member States’ external action 
was necessary in order to ensure continuity in their trade policies.23 However, Article 
111 EEC included limitations to the exercise of Member States’ powers. Paragraph 5 
required that before concluding international agreements with third countries, 
Member States had to coordinate their action and secure uniformity in their action, 
while the Commission was entrusted with the task of coordinating Member States’ 
external action.  
                       
21 Article 111 of the EEC Treaty provided: “In the course of the transitional period and without 
prejudice to Articles 115 and 116, the following provisions shall apply: 
1. Member States shall co-ordinate their commercial relations with third countries in such a way as to 
bring about, not later than at the expiry of the transitional period, the conditions necessary to the 
implementation of a common policy in the matter of external trade. 
The Commission shall submit to the Council proposals regarding the procedure to be applied, in the 
course of the transitional period, for the establishment of common action and regarding the 
achievement of a uniform commercial policy. 
2. The Commission shall submit to the Council recommendations with a view to tariff negotiations 
with third countries concerning the common customs tariff. 
The Council shall authorise the Commission to open such negotiations. 
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special Committee appointed 
by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework of such directives as the 
Council may issue to it. 
3. The Council shall, when exercising the powers conferred upon it under this Article, act during the 
first two stages by means of a unanimous vote and subsequently by means of a qualified majority vote. 
4. Member States shall, in consultation with the Commission, take all necessary measures with the 
object, in particular, of adjusting their tariff agreements in force with third countries in order that the 
entry into force of the common customs tariff may not be delayed. 
5. Member States shall aim at securing uniformity between themselves at as high a level as possible of 
their lists of liberalisation in regard to third countries or groups of third countries. For this purpose the 
Commission shall make any appropriate recommendations to Member States. 
If Member States abolish or reduce quantitative restrictions in regard to third countries, they shall 
inform the Commission beforehand and shall accord identical treatment to the other Member States.” 
22 Robert Kovar, “La mise en place d'une politique commerciale commune et les compétences des 
Etats membres de la Communauté économique européenne en matière de relations internationales et de 
conclusion des traités“, 16 Annuaire français de droit international 783 (1970), p. 786. 
23 Rafael Leal-Arcas, “Is EC trade policy up to par? A legal analysis over time – Rome, Marrakesh, 






Hence, the drafters of the Treaty of Rome had identified that the establishment 
of a Common Commercial Policy required close coordination between Member States 
and Community institutions. Although the Community was deemed to become the 
principal actor in this field after 1970, during the transitional period Member States 
action was still required in order to ensure continuity in their trade policy. However 
Member State action was subject to close scrutiny by the Commission which had the 
responsibility to promote the approximation of Member States’ national trade 
policies. 
 
a. The conclusion of trade agreements by Member States  
 
Within this framework, Community institutions took initiatives towards the 
coordination of Member States trade policies very early. In 1960 the Council adopted 
a decision introducing the so-called “EEC clause”,24 which required that Member 
States had to incorporate in all their existing agreements as well as in their future 
trade agreements a clause that provided that after the expiration of the trade 
agreement, the renewal or renegotiation of the trade agreement was going to be 
conducted in a way that ensured compatibility with Community law, hence implying 
the substitution of Members States by the Community as a contracting party.25 
Requiring from Member States to introduce this provision in their trade agreements, 
the Community in fact prepared the international community to recognize gradually 
the role of the EEC as the future international trade actor, while accepting the reality 
that Member States were still the main contracting parties.26 
Complementing the framework on the conclusion of trade agreements by 
Member States, the Council adopted in 1961 another decision, setting an expiry date 
for Member States trade agreements and identifying the coordination role of the 
Commission.27 More specifically, Articles 1 and 2 of the 1961 Decision required that 
the duration of trade agreements signed between Member States and third countries 
should not have extended beyond the end of the transitional period, subject to 
exceptions authorized by the Council. In addition, Article 3 required that until 1966 
the Commission would examine with Member States all existing Member States’ 
trade agreements, in order to ensure that they did not and would not obstruct the 
formation of uniform rules under the Common Commercial Policy. Hence, the 1961 
Council decision presented a roadmap regarding the transition from Member States to 
a Community trade policy, limiting the duration of future Member States agreements, 
requiring the insertion of an “EEC clause” in existing and future agreements and 
assigning to the Commission the task to scrutinize Member States agreements in order 
                       
24 Note concerning the text of the EEC clause, Council Decision of July 20, 1960, 4th General Report 
on the Activities of the Community, Chapter V, para. 192. 
25 The EEC clause read „Lorsque les obligations découlant du Traité instituant la Communauté 
Economique Européenne et relatives a l’instauration progressive d’une politique commerciale 
commune le rendront nécessaire, des négociations seront ouvertes dans le plus bref délais possible, afin 
d’apporter au présent accord toutes modifications utiles“. (Wenn die sich aus dem Vertrag zur 
Gründung der EWG ergebenden Verpflichtungen über die schrittweise Einführung einer gemeinsamen 
Handelspolitik es erfordern, werden so kurzfristig wie möglich Verhandlungen eingeleitet, mit dem 
Ziel, alle zweckdienlichen Änderungen in diese Abkommen aufzunehmen).  
26 Kovar, “La mise en place d'une politique commerciale commune et les compétences des Etats 
membres de la Communauté économique européenne en matière de relations internationales et de 
conclusion des traités“, supra note 22, p.788. 
27 Council Decision, On standardisation of the duration of trade agreements with third countries 





to ensure their compatibility with Community law. These provisions created a 
procedural framework for cooperation between Member States and Community 
institutions, which played also an important role in the approximation of the 
substantive content of the trade agreements concluded by different Member States 
with specific third countries.28 
Despite the broad pronouncements regarding the coordination of Member 
States trade agreement, little progress was made until the end of the transitional 
period. In 1962, the Commission announced its working program regarding the 
implementation of the Common Commercial Policy, which provided, among others, 
consultations between the Commission and Member States in order to harmonize their 
existing trade policies and examine Member States’ existing bilateral trade 
agreements.29 Nevertheless, the stagnation of European political integration during 
the mid-1960s and the secondary importance attributed to the Common Commercial 
Policy in the end of the transitional period, resulted in minimal results by the end of 
1969.30  
 
b.  The Community as an international actor 
 
The establishment of the Common Commercial Policy required not only the 
imposition of limitations on Member States external powers, but also the active 
engagement of the EU in the field of international trade. Indeed, the EEC had been 
active since its inception, taking part in important negotiations and trade agreements 
that were concluded during the 1960s. 
 Making use of the potential inscribed in Article 111(2) EEC, the Community 
concluded during the initial period a significant number of trade agreements with third 
countries.31 This exercise of Community powers was in parallel to the development of 
the scope of the Common Commercial Policy. Bearing in mind that the first field of 
the Common Commercial Policy where uniformity was established was the Common 
Customs Tariff,32 the Community began concluding customs tariff agreements with 
third countries.33 But even in cases where the Community concluded “trade” 
agreements with third countries,34 they were essentially tariff agreements, which 
contained only minimal elements of commercial policy.35 
                       
28 Klaus Michael Sachs, EG-Handelspolitik und zwischenstaatliche Kooperationsabkommen, (Baden 
Baden: Nomos, 1976), p. 42. 
29 EEC Bulletin, 1964, No 4, pp. 9, 13, 17. 
30 Hans von der Groeben and Ernst-Joachim Mestmacker, Zielen und Methoden der Europaischen 
Integration, (Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1972), p. 91. 
31 For a detailed description see Jacques Megret, “Conclusions, formes et effets des accords 
internationaux passés par la C.E.E.” 76 Revue du Marché Commun 19 (1965), p. 21. 
32 Eeckhout, External relations of the European Union. Legal and constitutional foundations, supra 
note 11, p. 10-11. 
33 In the period between 1960-1962 the Community held negotiations with a number of third countries 
and concluded bilateral customs tariff agreements with 22 third countries. Sachs, EG-Handelspolitik 
und zwischenstaatliche Kooperationsabkommen, supra note 28, p. 46. 
34 For example the EEC-Iran trade agreement of October 14, 1963 ((1963) OJ 2554 ) and the EEC-
Israel trade agreement of May 8, 1964 ((1964) OJ 1517). 
35 Kovar, “La mise en place d'une politique commerciale commune et les compétences des Etats 
membres de la Communauté économique européenne en matière de relations internationales et de 
conclusion des traités“, supra note 22, p. 793; Leal Arcas, “Is EC trade policy up to par? A legal 
analysis over time – Rome, Marrakesh, Amsterdam, Nice and the Constitutional Treaty”, supra note 





 In addition to bilateral trade agreements, the Community exercised its external 
trade competences by substituting gradually Member States in the framework of the 
GATT. As was mentioned above, the creation of the EEC was inspired by the GATT, 
as it constituted a customs union under Article XXIV GATT. Nevertheless, the 
Community started gradually taking over the role of the Member States as GATT 
Contracting Parties, without ever formally substituting them. 
 The gradual replacement of Member States in the GATT was achieved by 
different methods. Initially, the Community aimed to strengthen common action 
through its Member States, which was achieved via the use of common 
spokespersons. This method was further enhanced by common action taken by the 
representatives of the Member States together with the Commission representative.36 
This method of common representation was particularly used during the negotiations 
for the Dillon Round and more importantly, the Kennedy round, affirming the 
common presence of the EEC and its Member States as a single unitary bloc. 
Common action was also adopted for the conclusion of tariff agreements after these 
rounds. The Kennedy round agreements were concluded as mixed agreements, which 
on the one hand gave continuity to the action of Member States and on the other hand 
introduced the EEC as the new international actor in the field of the Common 
Commercial Policy.37  
The joint representation of the EEC and its Member States and the conclusion 
of mixed agreements in the framework of the GATT during the transitional period 
presented a smooth and legally sound model for the complete substitution of Member 
States by the Community. Although the Community had never substituted the 
Member States as a GATT Contracting Party, it assumed progressively the role of 
Member States.38 Soon after the expiry of the transitional period, the Court of Justice 
confirmed the de facto substitution of Member States under the GATT in International 
Fruit Company.39 The Court recognized that by assuming the functions inherent in 
tariff and trade policy, the Community “has been put into concrete form in different 
ways within the framework of the GATT and has been recognized by the other 
contracting parties.”40 The substitution of Member States by the Community became 
clearer during the 1970s and the 1980s, where the EEC assumed the role of the main 
negotiator and coordinator of Member States’ representation under the GATT, in 
particular in the field of dispute settlement.41 
Summing up, the Community set out during the transitional period the main 
foundations for the establishment of the Community trade policy. Following the 
development of uniform rules on external trade, the Community started gradually to 
                       
36 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “The EEC as a GATT Member – Legal conflicts between GATT law and 
Community law” in Meinhard Hilf, Francis G. Jacobs and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, eds., The 
European Community and the GATT (The Hague: Kluwer, 1986), p. 35-36; Kovar, “La mise en place 
d'une politique commerciale commune et les compétences des Etats membres de la Communauté 
économique européenne en matière de relations internationales et de conclusion des traités“, supra note 
22, p. 793. 
37 G. Testa, “Le Kennedy Round. Quelques aspects juridiques”, 14 Annuaire français de droit 
international 605 (1968), p. 638.  
38 Petersmann, “The EEC as a GATT member – Legal conflicts between GATT law and Community 
law”, supra note 36, p. 37-38. 
39 Cases C-21-24/72, International Fruit Company NV and others v. Produktschap voor Groenten en 
Fruit., 1972 E.C.R. 1219. 
40 Id., paras. 15-16. 
41 Petersmann, “The EEC as a GATT member – Legal conflicts between GATT law and Community 





conclude agreements on tariff policy, opting for close coordination and common 
action with the Member States. At the same time, the EEC put Member States trade 
agreements under scrutiny, aiming to ensure continuity in Member States trade policy 
and at the same time safeguard the gradual development of the Common Commercial 
Policy. Although the Community was not very successful in controlling Member 
States autonomous bilateral action, it achieved to establish itself as the main 
negotiator in the framework of the GATT, which presented the most important 
international framework for trade relations. 
 
2. Completing the Community trade policy (1970-1995) 
 
After the expiry of the transitional period, Article 113 EEC required the completion of 
the Common Commercial Policy and the substitution of Member States international 
trade agreements by Community agreements. Nevertheless, the common external 
representation of the Community and its Member States was not completed for a long 
time afterwards. Taking into account the vast number of Member States bilateral trade 
agreements, the unwillingness of certain third countries to renegotiate their 
agreements with the EEC and the gradual development of uniform trade rules by the 
Community, the EEC dealt with these problems in a pragmatic way, allowing some 
scope for Member States external action under the supervision of Community 
institutions. 
 
a.  The renewal of existing Member States bilateral trade agreements  
 
By the end of the transitional period, there was a significant number of bilateral 
Member States trade agreements with third countries.42 In order to avoid their 
termination, the Council adopted Decision 69/494/EEC in 1969 regarding existing 
and future Member States’ trade agreements with third countries.43 While establishing 
a procedural framework for the negotiation of Community agreements under Article 
113 EEC, the first title of Decision 69/494/EEC introduced a mechanism for the 
renewal of existing Member States trade agreements, which had been successfully 
used in the following decades. Aiming to protect Member States trade interests, this 
mechanism allowed Member States to ensure continuity in their trade policies until 
the Community exercised its powers. 
More specifically, Article 1 reaffirmed the obligation of Member States to 
notify Community institutions of their existing trade agreements whose duration was 
going to expire and Member States intended to prolong.44 In cases where their 
renegotiation or renewal by the Community was not possible, Article 3 of Decision 
69/494/EEC gave the opportunity to Member States to prolong the duration of these 
agreements for a maximum period of one year, in the hope of their replacement by 
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Community agreements.45 The renewal of Member States agreements was not 
automatic. Member States could only renew their existing agreements without being 
able to renegotiate or amend their substantive provisions. In addition, renewal was 
subject to authorization by the Commission, which was dependent on the 
compatibility of Member States’ agreements with the Common Commercial Policy.46 
Article 2 of Decision 69/494/EEC provided for consultations with the Commission, 
which aimed at identifying “whether the bilateral agreements to be extended expressly 
or tacitly contain provisions relating to the common commercial policy within the 
meaning of Article 113 and, if such be the case, whether such provisions could 
constitute an obstacle to that policy”.  
The authorization mechanism established in Articles 1-3 of Decision 
69/494/EEC reflects the pragmatic approach towards the development of the Common 
Commercial Policy that was adopted by EU institutions. Realizing that the 
substitution of all Member States bilateral trade agreements within a short time period 
was impossible, the Council gave the right to Member States to prolong the duration 
of their existing trade agreements with third countries. Nevertheless, the Community 
placed severe limitations on the external trade competences of Member States, so that 
they would not affect the development of the Common Commercial Policy. In fact, 
this mechanism was proved very helpful in materializing the gradual implementation 
of the Common Commercial Policy. It took into account the practical difficulties 
which the renegotiation of all Member States bilateral trade agreements entailed, 
which would be time and money consuming. In addition, it avoided political 
confrontations between Member States which had different trading bonds with 
different countries across the world and the conclusion of uniform Community wide 
agreements would be met with resistance.47 On the other hand, the inability of 
Member States to amend the substantive provisions of their trade agreement and their 
yearly scrutiny regarding their compatibility with the Common Commercial Policy 
predicated their eventual termination. As Member States were unable to adapt the 
content of their trade agreements to changing international trade conditions and as 
Community action in the field of external trade was gradually expanding, Member 
States agreements were eventually going to be terminated. 
 Nevertheless, until 2001 the Council issued regulations that authorized 
Member States to renew certain bilateral trade agreements with third countries. 
Recognizing the benefits arising from the substantive scope of such agreements, the 
Commission was eager to propose their renewal as long as there were not similar or 
conflicting rules established at the EU or at the international level. A good example is 
the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) agreements which several Member 
States had concluded with the U.S.. These agreements included provisions on public 
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procurement which were not covered under multilateral trade rules.48 Although the 
Community had eventually taken external action regarding public procurement by 
concluding the GATT Public procurement Agreement during the Tokyo round, the 
FCN agreements provided rights to EU and U.S. traders that were not covered under 
the GATT framework. After the introduction at the Community level of the Utilities 
Directive in 1990,49 the Commission considered that Member States FCN agreements 
were conflicting with the rules provided in the utilities directive and thus they should 
not have been renewed. Considering however that the subject matter of the FCN 
agreements was not covered under other international rules at that time, the Member 
States managed to obtain the renewal of their FCN agreements with the U.S., subject 
to the general condition that their application would not contravene EC law. 
Nevertheless, with the conclusion of the WTO agreements and in particular the 
agreement on Public Procurement, the content of the FCN agreements became 
obsolete and they were not subsequently renewed.50 
 Hence, the renewal of Member States agreements was conditional on the 
development of the Common Commercial Policy and international trade rules. 
However, since the last authorization of Member States agreements expired in 2005, 
the mechanism provided under Decision 69/494/EEC has been rendered defunct.51  
 
b. The conclusion of new trade agreements by Member States  
 
In addition to the renewal of existing Member States agreements, Decision 69/464 
EEC also provided the opportunity to Member States to conclude new trade 
agreements with third countries under specific circumstances. Article 9 provided that 
in exceptional circumstances Member States could negotiate and conclude trade 
agreements with third countries, in particular where negotiations by the EEC were not 
still possible. To that effect, Member States had to enter into consultations with other 
Member States and the Commission and obtain an explicit authorization from the 
Council in order to negotiate a trade agreement.52  
Despite the broad enunciation of the exceptional circumstances which could 
justify external action taken by Member States, the mechanism provided in Article 9 
of Decision 69/464/EEC arose as a result of the need to continue and establish vital 
bilateral trade relations with state trading countries of Eastern Europe. The refusal by 
those countries to recognize the international legal personality of the EEC affected 
directly the form of trade relations between Eastern and Western Europe, as Eastern 
European countries were willing to conclude trade agreements only with Member 
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States.53 In order to avoid unwanted political and trade consequences that would 
result from the termination of trade relations with Eastern European countries after 
1969, Decision 69/494/EEC provided a temporary solution. Adapting the Common 
Commercial Policy to the existing realities, the Community chose to conduct its trade 
policy with Eastern Europe via its Member States for a limited period hoping to  have 
achieved the EEC’s political recognition by that time.  
However, as from January 1 1973 onwards, Member States were no longer 
allowed to negotiate bilateral agreements with Eastern European countries and 
existing bilateral agreements expired on December 31 1974 leaving full competence 
in the hands of the Community. Nevertheless, when the transitional period expired in 
1974, there were no trade agreements concluded with Eastern European countries. As 
most of them rejected the Community’s suggested model agreement,54 the EEC 
subsequently resorted to an autonomous trade regime governing relations with state 
trading countries.55 The need for uniform external representation of the Community, 
alongside political considerations, resulted in the refusal to prolong Member States 
agreements with Eastern European states and their substitution by EEC internal 
measures.  
 The exception mechanism illustrates the limited scope for exceptions to the 
exercise of the Community’s exclusive competence in the field of trade in goods. 
Adjusting its trade policy to political realities of that time, the Community established 
a specific framework for the conclusion of trade agreements by Member States which 
was subject to coordination by the Commission. However, the nature of this 
mechanism was only provisional, as it did not aim to authorize Member States to act 
on behalf of the EEC, but only to provide much needed space to prepare for a 
Community wide agreement. The exceptional nature of this mechanism was 
confirmed when the conclusion of trade agreements between the EEC and Eastern 
European countries failed, as the Community opted to regulate trade with these 
countries unilaterally in order to create uniformity at the expense of any advantages 
that would be additionally accrued to European traders under a potential bilateral 
agreement.   
 
c.  The conclusion of trade agreements as mixed agreements 
 
In addition to the explicit mechanisms authorizing Member States to take external 
action in the field of trade policy, Member States affirmed their international standing 
by participating in trade agreements that were concluded as mixed agreements. 
Despite the pronouncement of the exclusive nature of EU competence in the field of 
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external trade in goods,56 the determination of the specific scope of the Common 
Commercial Policy was utilized under specific circumstances in order to justify the 
participation of Member States in trade agreements. The wide range of agreements 
regulating patterns of trade that went beyond traditional trade policy and which 
concerned areas where there were not yet uniform rules established, allowed for the 
participation of Member States alongside the Community in international trade 
arrangements.  
Illustrating how political realities affected the degree of interference of 
Member States in Community external trade action, the conclusion of the 
International Natural Rubber Agreement under auspices of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1979 as well as the GATT 
plurilateral Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) can serve as examples. 
Questioning the scope of Community powers in the field of the Common Commercial 
Policy, especially in areas where there were not any uniform rules, Member States 
managed to retain a role for themselves as international actors alongside the 
Community. 
More specifically, the determination of the scope of the Common Commercial 
Policy and subsequently the patterns of international trade with respect to which 
Member States had competence to conclude agreements with third countries was the 
subject matter of Opinion 1/78.57 This case, which concerned the conclusion of a 
commodity agreement on natural rubber that was negotiated under the framework of 
UNCTAD, exemplified the pragmatic and compromising approach adopted by the 
Court of Justice regarding the conclusion of international agreements relating to 
international trade. On the one hand, the Court recognized the dynamic nature of the 
Common Commercial Policy, which covered all matters affecting international trade. 
Acknowledging that a viable Common Commercial Policy had to cover different 
types of trade agreements, such as commodities agreements, which were very popular 
in the 1970s and 1980s, the Court confirmed the exclusive nature and broad scope of 
the Community’s trade policy.58 On the other hand, the Court took into account the 
non-trade aspects of the agreement, concerning the financing of the buffer stock on 
natural rubber, a key element of the agreement, which was going to be undertaken by 
the Member States. Although the Court had ruled in Opinion 1/75 that financial 
considerations do not affect the exclusive nature of EC competence over matters of 
trade policy, in Opinion 1/78 it ruled in favor of the conclusion of the UNCTAD 
agreement as a mixed one, thus safeguarding the viability of the Community’s trade 
policy, while accommodating the concerns of Member States.59  
Another example where trade agreements were concluded as mixed 
agreements present the plurilateral agreements that were concluded at the end of the 
Tokyo round in the framework of the GATT. Although most of these agreements 
were solely concluded by the Community, certain agreements, such as the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade and the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, were 
concluded as mixed agreements. Member States considered their participation in these 
agreements necessary, given that they were considered to go beyond the outer limits 
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of the Common Commercial Policy.60 Nevertheless, this argument was struck down 
by the Court fifteen years later, which ruled in Opinion 1/94 that the TBT agreement 
fell under exclusive Community competence.61  
However, it is necessary to point out that the lack of uniformity did not always 
present an impediment in the common representation of the Community towards third 
countries. This was particularly obvious as regards the quantitative restrictions on 
imports and exports of certain products, where Member States retained their national 
quotas and had the opportunity to adopt safeguard measures under Article 115 EEC.62 
Member States could adopt only unilateral measures, as the Community was the sole 
international actor, representing the Member States’ divergent trade interests towards 
third countries. For example, the import of Japanese cars in Europe, which was the 
subject of divergent regulation in different Member States during the 1980s, was dealt 
with within a trade arrangement that was negotiated and concluded between the 
Community and Japan, where the Community incorporated in its commitments the 
different individuals quotas set by Member States.63 
The procedural mechanism established under Part II of Decision 69/494/EEC 
concerning the negotiation of Community trade agreements contributed significantly 
towards succeeding in incorporating Member States trade interests in the Common 
Commercial Policy. The establishment of the “113 Committee”, which assisted the 
Commission in the negotiation of trade agreements, played a crucial role in the 
amalgamation of Member States trade interests and the formation of common action 
even in areas where uniform rules were not yet established.64   
 
3. The transition from national to EU trade policy of newly acceded Member 
States 
 
The gradual completion of the Common Commercial Policy during the 1990s 
rendered the Community the sole international actor in the field of external trade in 
goods. The recognition in Opinion 1/94 of exclusive Community competence to 
conclude the WTO multilateral agreements in trade in goods signified the main step 
towards the completion of Community trade policy. The firm international position of 
the Community in the field of external trade was affirmed during the recent 
enlargement of the EU, as the transition from national to Community trade policy of 
newly acceded Member States demonstrates. Coping successfully with the challenges 
raised by the great number and diverse content of the trade agreements concluded by 
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twelve new Member States, the Community managed to integrate them in its trade 
policy. 
The adoption of the EU acquis in the field of the Common Commercial Policy 
required acceding Member States not only to align their external trade legislation with 
Community legislation, but also to undertake the same international commitments as 
the other EU Member States. In order to achieve this goal, the Commission had 
placed foremost emphasis on the alignment of new Member States commitments 
under the WTO agreements with EC commitments. During the accession negotiations 
the EU had established a framework for cooperation with new Member States at 
ministerial and departmental level, ensuring the alignment of new Member States 
trade policy with EU trade policy before their accession to the EU.65 
In addition, the proper implementation of the Community acquis in the field of 
the Common Commercial Policy demanded that new Member States undertook the 
same international commitments under bilateral trade agreements. In that respect, 
Article 6 of the Act concerning the conditions of accession66 obliged new Member 
States to accede to all international agreements concluded by the Community, setting 
out specific obligations for different groups of agreements. For example, paragraphs 6 
and 7 concerned trade agreements in the sensitive sectors of textiles and steel, 
indicating the need for their substantive amendments. Following accession, the EU 
and new Member States concluded a number of protocols and renegotiated a number 
of agreements in order to ensure the uniform application of EU trade agreements in 
new Member States.67  
Last but not least, the accession of new Member States did not leave any room 
for the survival of new Member States bilateral trade agreements. Article 6(10) of the 
Act concerning the conditions of Accession explicitly provided that “new Member 
States shall withdraw from any free trade agreements with third countries”. Moreover, 
new Member States were not offered the possibility to retain existing bilateral trade 
agreements to the extent that they were compatible with the Common Commercial 
Policy. The proposal by the Commission to subject new Member States agreements to 
the regime of Article 1 of Decision 69/464/EEC was not accepted by the Council, thus 
terminating definitively any trade agreements concluded by acceding Member 
States.68 The importance of a uniform trade policy since accession was further 
enhanced by the fact that no transitional period was offered, or in fact requested by 
most new Member States, regarding their obligations to conform with the acquis in 
the field of the Common Commercial Policy. 
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As a result, the accessions of 2004 and 2007 illustrate a departure from the 
pragmatic and gradual transition from Member States to EU trade policy. Considering 
that by the time of the accession the EU had become the sole international actor in the 
field of trade policy, the integration of twelve national trade policies did not justify a 
step back in the single representation of the Community in the field of trade in goods. 
On the contrary, close cooperation between the Commission and the new Member 
States and the proper administration of the implementation of the Community acquis 
guaranteed a fast and efficient transition from national to EU trade policy. 
 
C. Lessons to be learnt from the development of Community trade policy 
 
The development of EU trade policy can provide valuable lessons for the 
development of EU investment policy. The mechanisms and procedures that 
contributed to the transition from national to EU trade policy can provide guidance for 
designing a complete EU investment policy and ensuring smooth transition. 
 
1. A gradual development of EU investment policy? 
 
The development of a complete EU trade policy was a long process that required 
more than thirty years to be completed. In addition to the twelve year transitional 
period that was identified in the Treaty of Rome, it took thirty more years in order for 
the EU to substitute Member States as the single international actor in the field of 
external trade in goods. However, the development of a common, complete EU 
investment policy could and arguably should be completed in a much shorter period. 
Firstly, the slow and gradual evolution of EU trade policy was linked directly 
with the progress of internal integration. The effort of the EEC to affirm its 
international legal personality and to identify the main characteristics of EU external 
action affected the determination of the scope and exclusive nature of Community 
competence. As a result, it was only fifteen and eighteen years after the introduction 
of the Common Commercial Policy that the Court recognized the exclusive nature and 
dynamic scope of Community powers in this field. 
Following the main rationale behind the development of EU trade policy, 
namely that it followed the degree of internal integration, would suggest that a shorter 
transition period of EU investment policy is feasible and desirable. The introduction 
of EU investment policy comes at a different historical period, when the foundations 
of EU integration and the general characteristics of the role of the EU as an 
international actor are well established. The rules on the scope and nature of express 
and implied powers are now explicitly provided in Articles 3-5 and 216 TFEU, 
expressing a long-standing jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on the determination 
of EU external competences.69 Within this framework, a clear determination of the 
scope and nature of EU competences in the field of foreign investment can be easier 
determined, allowing EU investment policy to be developed faster so as reflect the 
degree of internal integration. 
Indeed, the promotion of the same economic interests that required a gradual 
development of EU trade policy indicates that the development of EU investment 
policy is necessary to be completed faster. The pragmatism that dictated the gradual 
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development of Community trade policy was successful in promoting the trade 
interests of the Community, its Member states and Community traders, as there were 
still different national interests that required a departure from uniform rules and to 
some extent common external representation. The implementation of a complete and 
uniform Community trade policy shortly after the end of the transitional period would 
only lead to inefficiencies and controversies, given that internal integration had not 
yet reached the level that would ensure common competitive conditions between 
traders across the Community. On the other hand, it is questionable whether the 
gradual development of EU investment policy in the course of the next twenty or 
thirty years would be beneficial for EU investors and EU Member States as 
investment exporting or importing countries. The development of an EU investment 
policy within a short time period can firstly contribute significantly to the attainment 
of the objectives of the internal market, ensuring equal opportunities for all European 
investors that wish to invest in third countries and enhancing competitiveness in the 
internal market, eradicating the influence that the existence of a BIT between a 
Member State and a third country may exert on the choice of third country investors 
to establish themselves in that specific Member State instead of another one. More 
importantly, the determination of a complete EU investment policy would contribute 
significantly to legal certainty, which is a central regulatory concern of Member 
States, third countries and in particular foreign investors. The clear determination of 
the role of the EU and its Member States in the field of foreign investment can ensure 
the rights of foreign investors and avoid multiple and conflicting obligations of 
Member States and third countries.70  
Secondly, the gradual development of Community trade policy was driven by 
the development of international trade regulation. The scope and orientation of the 
Common Commercial Policy were linked with the evolution of trade rules under the 
GATT and later under the auspices of the WTO. As the GATT presented the main 
international regulatory framework on trade in goods, the effective participation of the 
Community in the GATT constituted the most important element of the Community’s 
external action in the field of trade in goods. Besides, the constant evolution of GATT 
rules, which resulted in the conclusion of the WTO agreements covering disciplines 
that were not included in the original GATT 1947, contributed to the gradual 
development of Community trade policy. Linking the scope of its action to 
international developments, the Community let elements of Member States trade 
policies that were expressed in their bilateral agreements to survive much longer than 
expected, as the example of the FCN treaties with the U.S. illustrates. 
In contrast with the development of EU trade policy, the development of EU 
investment policy should not rely on the progress of the relevant international rules. 
Although the scope and content of international rules on foreign investment should 
play a key role in determining the substantive content of EU investment policy, as 
was the case in the field of trade, the creation of a uniform investment policy should 
not depend on the development of international investment rules. Considering the lack 
of a multilateral regulatory framework on foreign investment,71 it would be futile to 
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wait until its development in order to determine EU investment policy and confine its 
scope to the subject matters that will be addressed in it. Instead of merely following 
the development of international investment rules, the EU should be a frontrunner, 
identifying not only the common subject matters that are regulated in BITs, but also 
any other aspects of foreign investment regulation which the EU considers necessary 
to introduce in future investment agreements; this would entail a thorough ex ante 
planning of EU investment policy. 
Thirdly, the substitution of Member States BITs by new investment 
agreements, be it EU agreements or mixed agreements, would necessarily imply a 
tremendous coordination and resources in order to be completed. Nevertheless, 
drawing inspiration from the recent enlargement experience, the accomplishment of 
this task by the Commission and the Member States is not insurmountable. The 
recording and grouping of Member States investment agreements as well as the 
prioritization of their renegotiation could be well planned and executed by the EU and 
its Member States. During the past enlargement the completion of this task within 
such short time was achieved because there was already an existing Community trade 
framework, which new Member States simply had to implement. In that respect, the 
successful substitution of Member States BITs by EU/mixed agreements within a 
short time period depends on the prior determination of the key elements and 
characteristics of EU investment policy. In that respect, the prioritization of EU 
negotiating partners which the Commission proposes72 can boost the proper 
implementation of EU investment policy, as it is based on clear criteria that reflect the 
objectives of EU investment policy.73  
Consequently, the EU is today better equipped to plan and implement its 
investment policy. On the basis of clear principles, the EU can identify from the 
outset the scope of EU powers and determine accordingly the content and objectives 
of EU investment policy. Of course, the demarcation of the scope of EU powers may 
probably lead to the conclusion that not all aspects of foreign investment regulation 
fall under exclusive EU competence. Nevertheless, it will indicate the way forward, 
pinpointing the areas where close cooperation between the EU and its Member States 
is not only desirable but also necessary and creating the conditions for the 
establishment of common rules and guiding principles.  
As a result, the Investment Policy Communication seems to avoid the crucial 
question of determining the exact scope of EU powers and suggest ways of 
coordination with Member States on issues falling under their competences. The 
vague language used and the indirect hints on the aspects of foreign investment 
regulation which fall under EU competence undermine the foundations of EU 
investment policy.74 Although the Commission rightly places emphasis on the 
principles that guide the development of the substantive content of EU investment 
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policy,75 it fails to recognize that the establishment of a framework for cooperation 
with the Member States based on the distribution of competences in the field of 
foreign investment, is a necessary precondition for the smooth, proper and 
undisrupted development of a complete EU investment policy.  
 
2. The transition from national to EU investment policy 
 
The historical evolution of Community trade policy can be particularly helpful in the 
devise of specific mechanisms that can ensure smooth transition from national to 
supranational investment policy. Drawing from past experiences, the EU and its 
Member States can use similar methods in order to replace existing Member States 
agreements by new agreements, promoting legal certainty and guaranteeing the 
advantages accrued to EU and third country investors under the existing network of 
BITs. 
 Despite promoting a short period for the transition from Member States BITs 
to EU-wide investment agreements, the EU should avoid authorizing the conclusion 
of new investment agreements by its Member States. In 1969, when the Community 
trade policy was not yet complete, the EEC had explicitly refused to authorize the 
conclusion of trade agreements by Member States. The exception provided in Article 
9 of Decision 69/464/EEC was limited in scope and time, serving the need of 
concluding trade agreements which were impossible to be concluded by the EEC for 
political reasons. Considering the failure of this mechanism to achieve the envisaged 
results, namely the conclusion of an agreement between the Community and Eastern 
European countries, and the subsequent achievement of the benefits envisaged via the 
adoption of autonomous measures, it is questionable whether the EU should allow the 
conclusion of Member States BITs in the future. 
In that respect, the proposal of the Commission to authorize the conclusion of 
new BITs by Member States,76 even under close supervision by the Commission and 
based on common guidelines should be viewed with skepticism. The authorization of 
Member States to conclude new trade agreements on behalf of the EU was used very 
scarcely, mainly in order to substitute for the lack of international stand of the EU 
under specific international legal frameworks. The same stance has also been 
followed in other areas of EU law, so that Member States were authorized to conclude 
international agreements in areas of EU exclusive competence only where it was 
impossible for the EU to participate.77 However, there is no legal or external political 
impediment for the conclusion of investment agreements by the EU. On the contrary, 
the conclusion of new BITs by Member States could impact negatively on the 
establishment of EU investment policy, as it would deprive a major incentive for 
Member States to cooperate with the Commission and conclude jointly new 
agreements. More importantly, the conclusion of new investment agreements, would 
                       
75 For an analysis of the Commission’s intentions regarding the substantive content of EU investment 
policy and the questions posed see Woolcock and Kleinheisterkamp, “The EU approach to 
international investment policy after the Lisbon treaty,”supra note 3, p. 31-52. 
76 Proposed Regulation, supra note 2, Chapter 3. 
77 For example agreements concluded under the aegis of the United Nations, such as the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) or the International Maritime Organization (IMO), where only States are 
entitled to participate in agreements. See Cremona, “Member States as trustees of the Community 






not add to legal certainty as proposed,78 but it would rather prolong uncertainty, given 
that Member States BITs would constantly be under revision by the Commission, 
which could withdraw authorization, if it found incompatibilities with EU law or that 
the BIT obstructs the development of EU investment policy.79  
 On the other hand, legal certainty and continuity in Member States investment 
policy necessitates a different policy regarding existing BITs. The mechanism 
established in Articles 1-3 of Decision 69/464/EEC can provide a useful model for the 
renewal of existing BITs. Subjecting the renewal of Member States BITs to 
authorization by EU institutions, which is dependent on the compatibility of Member 
States BITs with EU law can achieve continuity in Member States’ action, preserving 
investors’ interests. In that regard, the mechanism proposed in Chapter II of the 
Proposed Regulation on authorization of Member States BITs80 is based on a model 
that was successfully used in the past, guaranteeing Member States’ interests that 
were not yet integrated in Community external action. 
 More specifically, the notification mechanism established in Article 2 of the 
proposed Regulation enables the proper screening of existing Member States BITs, 
ensuring legal certainty. Similar to Regulation 69/494/EEC, the Proposed Regulation 
conditions authorization upon compatibility with substantive EU law as well as upon 
the development of EU investment policy, thus preserving the autonomy and 
supremacy of EU law, whilst preserving Member States’ agreements. Nevertheless, 
the proposed regulation differs from Regulation 69/494/EEC in that it allows the 
amendment and renegotiation of Member States BITs. Subjecting the amendment of 
existing Member States BITs to authorization and close scrutiny by the Commission, 
this mechanism enables Member States to adapt their BITs in cases where their 
authorization is withdrawn because of incompatibilities with EU law.81 Hence this 
additional mechanism addresses the need for continuity of Member States BITs, as 
their duration can be prolonged until their replacement by EU agreements, without 
leaving a gap in case they had to be terminated.  
Of course, the authorization of existing Member States BITs and the potential 
for their amendment need not result in a thirty year long transitional period as in the 
field of trade. In that respect, the granting of review and authorization powers to the 
Commission instead of the Council, as well as the recognition of the delay in the 
Council to authorize the opening of EU negotiations on investment with a specific 
third country as a valid ground for withdrawal of authorization of Member States 
                       
78 Proposed Regulation, supra note 2, p.2. 
79 See Woolcock and Kleinheisterkamp, “The EU approach to international investment policy after the 
Lisbon treaty,”supra note 3, p. 67, who argues that the mechanism proposed “does not really contribute 
to enhancing legal certainty but could be seen as an instrument to give the Commission more leverage 
in its relation with Member States that are reluctant to change or give up their BITs”. Although this 
mechanism is probably the most efficient solution so as to eliminate incompatibilities and maintain 
legal protection arising from existing BITs, it is questionable whether additional uncertainty should be 
created regarding new Member States’ BITs.  
80 Proposed Regulation, supra note 2. 
81 “In recognition of the fact that Member States may be required or may find necessary to amend or 
modify investment agreements, in particular to bring them in compliance with Treaty obligations, this 
proposal also establishes a framework and conditions to empower Member States to enter into 
negotiations with a third country with a view to modifying an existing bilateral agreement relating to 





BITs are innovative elements that can contribute to the speedier and more efficient 
implementation of EU investment policy.82  
Addressing the main handicap of the authorization mechanism provided in 
Decision 69/464/EEC, the EU can also draw insights from the mechanisms used 
during the transitional period in the field of trade. The Commission could insist on the 
inclusion of an “EU clause” in existing Member States BITs, whenever they are 
renewed. A clause that would provide that any future renegotiation of the BIT would 
be undertaken by the EU (in addition to the contracting Member State) could assist in 
the faster recognition of the EU as an international actor in the field of foreign 
investment and, consequently, contribute to the efficient implementation of a 




The historical evolution of Community trade policy and the transition from national to 
Community trade policy provides valuable lessons for designing EU investment 
policy. The successful creation and implementation of a uniform trade policy was 
based on the close cooperation of all relevant stakeholders, taking into account EU 
constitutional and international realities. The development of Community trade policy 
was successful, as it reflected the development of internal integration and contributed 
to the strengthening of international trade rules. Within that framework, Community 
trade policy developed gradually not only during the transitional period identified in 
the EEC Treaty, but also for a significant period afterwards. It was based on 
innovative but realistic mechanisms that were established in EU secondary law, in 
particular Decision 69/494/EEC, which allowed for the continuation of Member 
States trade agreements until their substitution by EU agreements under the 
supervision of Community institutions, thus exemplifying the obligation of 
Community organs and Member States to cooperate harmoniously.83   
Drawing inspiration from Community trade policy, the success of EU 
investment policy depends on the willingness of all institutional actors to cooperate 
closely, taking into account the developments of EU law and the realities of 
international investment law. In that respect, EU investment policy should be based 
on clear and strong foundations, identifying both the orientation and substantive 
content of EU investment policy and also the proper method of cooperation with 
Member States. The development of EU investment policy should avoid a long 
transitional period, as it would only prolong legal uncertainty. Considering the boost 
to EU competitiveness that a complete EU investment policy will bring in light of EU 
internal economic integration, EU investment policy can be successful only if it is 
well planned and properly implemented. Moreover, the international presence of the 
EU today allows it to lead rather than follow the gradual evolution of international 
investment rules.  
More importantly, the transition from national to EU investment policy can be 
based on mechanisms similar to those devised in the field of trade. Allowing the 
continuation of existing Member States investment agreements under close scrutiny 
by EU institutions has proved very helpful in the past and can contribute significantly 
to a smooth transition in the field of foreign investment. Building upon trade 
                       
82 See Woolcock and Kleinheisterkamp, “The EU approach to international investment policy after 
the Lisbon treaty,” supra note 3, pp. 64-65. 





experience and enhancing the robustness of mechanisms used in the past, the 
Proposed Regulation provides overall appropriate tools for easing transition towards a 
complete EU investment policy. Nevertheless, the success of the transitional regime 
and the introduction of the EU investment policy depends ultimately on the political 
will of the involved stakeholders and their harmonious cooperation. 
   
    
 
 
  
 
